Walking from the Place Royale on rue de la Régence in Brussels, one cannot evade the perspective of the Palais de Justice, located in the opposite direction with the ville basse at its feet. Beyond the peristyle of the main entrance, there is the colossal salle des pas-perdus underneath the dome, supported by four pillars of more than 40 metres high, with grandiose staircases and seemingly endless rows of galleries. Designed by architect Joseph Poelaert in 1861 and completed in 1883, the Law Courts of Brussels is a striking example of nineteenth century monumentalism-but it was also mired in controversy. Chief engineer Clément Labye criticised the "particular measures" surrounding the adoption of the final blueprint and the choice of Poelaert, an architect whose propensity to excess was also reflected in his inability to provide accurate estimates. The building, commissioned by Léopold I and unveiled by his successor Léopold II, had to reflect Belgium's peculiar history and its newly found "national distinctiveness," as Silverman notes:
The attempts to characterise the Palais by its contemporaries revealed how it lay outside the canon of traditional forms of European eclecticism and its inventory of historicist associations. Here style reverted to a pre-history or primal periods in a distant past, appropriate to the Belgians' search for architectural types untainted by the evocation of French, Austrian, Spanish, or Dutch legacies, all linked to rulers and conquerors before Belgium's emergence as a sovereign power in 1830-31. 1 It was the concrete illustration of a larger attempt to define Belgian identity in spite of the heterogeneity of this small country divided along linguistic lines between Flemish and Walloon peoples, later accompanied by a reform of the legal system in the early 1890s aimed at "knitting together a myriad of local, communal, regional, and municipal particularisms and precedents into a workable central structure." 2 Belgium's quest for expansion outside Europe, and in particular, the King's sole proprietorship of a territory about 76 times the size of his dominion-the Congo Free State-was another expression of Léopold II's efforts to cement his reputation and solidify his rule. A typical exercise in nation-state building, it was supported by a propaganda machine at home that took the form of monuments, expositions, museums, and public education initiatives that successfully convinced the Belgians of their renewed sense of purpose, among other European imperial powers as well as abroad.
The Mobutu's party, the Mouvement populaire de la révolution (MPR), was created.
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A little less than a century after Léopold II's bid for "national distinctiveness" in his construction of the Belgian body politic thus began the process of decolonisation in the former colony and the establishment of a sovereign Congo. In the era of the nation-state, the only model deemed legitimate by the international system, the right to self-determination necessarily entailed the reconceptualisation of African societies in light of this paradigm shift. It is in this context that Mobutu provided a supply of ideas informed by precolonial times and African traditions by appealing to a doctrine named recours à l'authenticité-an attempt to discard or efface the colonial legacy and reconcile these ideas of the past with the modernity of his era. Congo was turned into Zaïre, Joseph-Désiré Mobutu became Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga, streets and monuments were stripped of their imperial attributes and carried names à résonnance zaïroise starting 1 January 1972.
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Authenticité was meant as a reaction against colonialism that reaffirmed the nation's "African"
or "Zaïrian" character. As Pauwels and Pintens note, it constituted moins un retour en arrière, vers des valeurs historiques, qu'une prise de conscience de l'être propre de l'Africain zaïrois, qui se rend compte qu'il veut réfléchir et surtout agir au départ d'un point de vue propre, en délaissant les usages, les valeurs, les opinions et les préjugés qui lui avaient été imposés par la colonisation.
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The novelty of authenticité lies less in its insistence that Africans should liberate themselves through a prise de conscience rather than a strict retour en arrière, as other movements like négritude already advocated, but in the totality of its application to all fields that govern life, from law to politics, from economics to culture. In Mobutu's view, authenticité was an allencompassing "African philosophy," even though it appeared to most as the instrument of legitimisation of a mere political programme-and a particularly brutal one at that. It is little surprising that current scholarship is often consistent with this approach, with historians, anthropologists, and political scientists treating authenticité either as a fetish, by examining the history of the Mobutist state through cultural expressions that reflected this strange "philosophical" anomaly, or as a hollow concept, a piece of propaganda-which it also partly was. It seems necessary, however, to take authenticité at face value in order to confront its claims, namely that it represented a departure from the ferocity of the colonial experience and provided a cohesive and comprehensive value system (cultural, political, legal, and economic) to harmonise the past with the present. On both accounts authenticité failed, not least because the language it spoke was anything but "authentic"-nor truly "new" for that matter-but also because its archetypes reproduced the colonial violence it insisted on refuting. These tropes were neither the end nor the beginning of something but the extension of history itself, with its inescapable colonial past. Such encounter with authenticité, according to its own terms, may allow us to mediate these different perspectives found in Zaïrian historiography with regards to Mobutu's legacy, and reveal patterns of subjugation that never ceased to exist.
Examining the president's speeches, interviews, and memorandums, I first assess the level of authenticity of authenticité itself, exposing its motives as well as its inconsistencies.
If authenticité's kinship to the colonial precedent is clearly apparent in words, it is too in practice. These words become an essential component of the state apparatus, as I demonstrate in the second part; the rhetoric is employed to justify Zaïre's cultural, political, legal, and economic programme, and in all cases parallels can be drawn with the colonial period and Belgium's own peculiar history. This "postcolonial potentate," to borrow explaining this with the fallacious reasoning of a sophism: "We are neither left nor right. We are authentically Zaïrian." 16 The opposition between left and right Mobutu dismissed as invalid in Zaïre because it would be "inauthentic" closely resembled his rhetorical explanation for the supremacy of "democracy" within his one-party state:
Pour décrire nos sociétés traditionnelles négro-africaines, ethnologues et sociologues ont inventé le concept de « démocratie existentielle ». Chez nous, la discussion -la palabrea pour objectif de faire émerger l'unanimisme. Vous vous émerveillez actuellement, en France, de découvrir le « consensus » ; permettez-moi de vous faire remarquer que c'est une invention africaine ! Au Zaïre, on discute, on parle, on palabre et la décision n'intervient qu'une fois l'unanimité faite sur le problème étudié. Vous vous étonnez souvent des scores obtenus à nos élections ou à nos référendums, de cet unanimisme mis en lumière par nos consultations. L'explication est simple. C'est que, chez nous, le peuple rejette la notion de majorité et de minorité qui s'affrontent.
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The quote illustrates Mobutu's didactic role, "teaching" the "Other" about African societyin this case, a French journalist-by evoking an authentic feature of Congolese society-the "palaver tree," a traditional assembly of elders who gathered together to discuss important issues pertaining to their community-despite the fact he discarded this very feature in Zaïre as backward and incompatible with the "modernity" he put forward ("Il est grand temps de There was therefore a gap between the "African" rhetoric projected onto the "Other,"
and the way Mobutu conveyed these images at home; and oddly enough, within Zaïre this discourse borrowed as much from precolonial precedents as it did from the colonial legacy.
Indeed, the contribution of authenticité to Zaïrian society was sometimes framed in terms eerily similar to Belgian propaganda and the language of Catholic missions in the heyday of colonialism. The infantilisation of the postcolonial subject is a "pervasive metaphor" in continuity with Zaïre's political imaginary, as Schatzberg argues in his study of the Mobutist regime. It is no accident that Mobutu relied on traditional attributes-the leopard skin being a prime example of such reprocessed precolonial symbols-to establish himself as the omnipotent, generous "Father/Chief" whose benevolence would lead the "national family" on the road to peace, justice, and dignity. 26 In case of improper behaviour, rebels received fatherly indulgence, with Mobutu offering to guide them back on the straight path: "Il faut réintégrer dans la nation tous ses enfants perdus, savoir oublier, pardonner." 27 The metaphor extends to the benefits provided by the President-Founder to his people, as De Boeck notes:
By means of a perverted interpretation of the traditional "gift logic," in which debt becomes positive, offering a source of social cohesion, the notion of "gift" (gifts from the "father of the nation" to his children) creates a "debt" and a dependence of the people upon their leader.
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This relation of dependence based on the gift/debt analogy also permeated the attitudes of Machiavelli, using it to highlight the importance of persuasion in overcoming resistance:
Machiavel notait déjà aux XVI ème siècle [sic] "Il faut donc savoir qu'il y a deux manières de combattre : l'une par les lois, l'autre par la force : la première sorte est propre aux hommes, la seconde propre aux bêtes ; mais comme la première bien souvent NE suffit PAS, il faut recourir à la seconde. Ce pourquoi est nécessaire aux princes (c'était eux qui commandaient à l'époque) de savoir bien pratiquer la bête et l'homme." 32 It is striking how the document perpetuates the dichotomy between man and beast that pervades the imperial discourse, encouraging Zaïre's military to fight "unconscious tribalism" through a recourse to "social and psychological action, which should prevail over armed action." 33 It seems obvious that Mobutism and authenticité were part of this counterinsurgency strategy. More surprisingly still, the pamphlet describes the evolution of 29 Albert de Vleeschauwer cited in Guy Vanthemsche, Belgium and the Congo, 1885-1980, trans 
Ruling authentically by decree: Mobutism in practice
As we have seen, although authenticité was articulated as faithful to the "African heritage" it purported to invoke, using a language that it insisted was radically new based on Mobutu's emphasis on l'action over le verbe, it nevertheless replicated the colonial rhetoric at discourse level, particularly when addressing Zaïrians themselves. Nevertheless, Mobutu intended to deliver on its promise with tangible propositions for change, hence the "Zaïrianisation" of Congolese society began in 1972. In addition to the name changes discussed above, the initiative also took the form of a new dress code stressing the need to abandon colonial fashions, with the introduction of the abacost, a short or long-sleeved light jacket which supposedly expressed the rejection of foreign manners despite its resemblance to a Mao suit-abacost is an abbreviation for à bas le costume, or "down with the suit. The connection between culture and politics is a constant in the works of White, Van
Beurden, Fabian, and others. What is less explored is how this relationship recalls Belgium's own nation-state building effort, heavily reliant on imperial undertakings to affirm its cohesion at a later stage, 40 but originally manufactured by the country's elites rather than being the expression of an "organic or spontaneous" sense of belonging to the great "Belgian" nation on the part of its inhabitants, as Lecours argues. He further adds: "The Belgian nation was created following a revolution that may hardly be described as the product of a popular movement." Lecours traces the creation of Belgium's "territorial identity landscape" to institutional change in the 1830s that allowed the French-speaking bourgeoisie to erect linguistic homogenisation as the raison d'état of the Belgian sovereign state, which eventually fostered the creation of a Flemish identity in response to these "centralised, unitary and de facto unilingual structures."
The specific nature of elite power struggles is a crucial variable in the creation of territorial identities. More specifically, the dynamic of elite competition constitutes a motor of identity formation and transformation. In sum, institutional development and Congolese society-cleavages that brought him to power, after all-a careful move to prevent the repetition of a pattern similar to the Belgian case. 43 Callaghy argues that Zaïre could never be defined as "bourgeois" and that the legacy of the colonial administration can be better described as "political aristocracy," based on the fact Zaïrian political elites never seemed interested in the collective good, preferring instead to maintain a strictly authoritarian order while extracting resources that could benefit only themselves. 44 The regional dissentions Mobutu faced during his reign were maybe not mere repeats from the Congo Crisis that followed independence, but attempts at forging similarly distinct chief, everywhere represented as a "leopard" with powers over life and death, is thus part of the material apparatus of a ritual which objectively represented and confirmed the truth of general principles fundamental to the constitution and continuity of social life, while at the same time the ritual was central to the political and economic processes.
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MacGaffey was referring to the MuKongo tradition, but his analysis can extend to the way power was exercised in Mobutu's Zaïre. Mobutu seems to have purposely perverted chiefly heritage to his advantage, which allowed him to reproduce its characteristic violencerepressing dissent and stifling all opposition-due to the ubiquity of these beliefs in this part of Africa; moreover, authenticité proved useful in asserting the validity of this image while insisting that the reform of certain aspects of the chiefly tradition was neededconveniently, those that were deemed inappropriate in the age of modernity also happened to be unsuitable to the deformation imposed by the Mobutist state.
The realm of law became the field of predilection to institute such amendments. As
Young and Turner note, starting 5 January 1973 with the introduction of the 73/015 legislation, "collectivities lost all autonomy and became simple territorial subdivisions,"
"distinctions among chieftaincies, sectors, and centres was abolished," and "collectivity chiefs were integrated into the regional administration. Under the Second Republic, Mobutu affirmed his intention to continue this process through the "Zaïrianisation" of the economy, a platform vaguely described on 30 November 1973 before the National Legislative Council. Here again, the seizing and redistribution of agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing foreign assets by the state was promoted with the language of authenticité, whose interpretation of land ownership summoned the "African tradition" in support of its pretentions. In the words of Bayona ba Meya Muna Kimvimba, the President of the Supreme Court:
Il est une constante en honneur dans la plupart sinon dans la totalité des coutumes africaines, selon laquelle, la terre n'a jamais fait l'objet d'appropriation individuelle ; la propriété foncière est et a toujours été collective ; jamais la terre ne pouvait faire l'objet d'une aliénation, car vendre la terre eût équivalu à vendre son âme, ses forces propres, ses forces cosmiques.
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The "collective good" that was land had to be made more efficient since it was Mobutism's objective to put the country's resources to good use. On 26 December 1973, the Bureau politique, Conseil des Ministres and a number of deputies reunited to discuss the practical application of Mobutu's call to action. In effect, they bartered slices of the "magnificent Zaïrian cake," to paraphrase Léopold's own reading of the Scramble for Africa; the acquisition of these newly nationalised businesses was made by the ruling political elite and Mobutu's close entourage. There was public outcry in Zaïre following the implementation of these measures: Mobutu responded by bureaucratising his "Zaïrianisation" plan, in an effort to appear transparent while officialising neopatrimonial practices through paperwork.
Theoretically, any Zaïrian could therefore buy a plantation or a business from the state by filling out a form, and after the conduct of a solvency check was performed. This did not prevent members of the Bureau politique to be awarded plantations, and deputies to be exempted from the painstaking application process. As Young and Turner note:
The cement of clientage was access to resources. The sudden takeover of this huge zone of the economy offered a vast new pool of goods for patrimonial distribution to deserving members of the political class. . . . Potentially lucrative assets were to be acquired as virtually free goods; the political capital of proximity to power could be thus converted into solid material equity with the promise of effortless accumulation. Among other things, the Zaïrianisation measures were a class action by the politico-commercial bourgeoisie.
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The "Zaïrianisation" initiative was obviously a failure, marred by the incompetence of corrupted acquéreurs with no previous experience or knowledge of whole swathes of Zaïre's economy-but with a penchant for tax evasion-whose actions led to massive layoffs, rampant shortages and inflation. way the "African tradition" Mobutu obstinately upheld became a rhetorical instrument at the service of an oppressive potentate whose very origins may be confounded with those of the imperial father figure itself.
There is a tendency in academic literature about the Mobutist state to cast Zaïrians as "helpless spectators" in the face of the countless abuses committed by the regime, as Young and Turner suggest; 65 Schatzberg insists that Mobutu succeeded in the "occupation of all available political space and ideological obfuscation" through strategies of dominance and coercion; 66 Callaghy, comparing the fate of the Zaïrian citizen to that of the Frenchman under absolutist rule, contends that centralisation weakened the power of traditional communities and destroyed their sense of identity while increasing their dependence on the totalitarian state. 67 I do not mean to underplay the devastating consequences of Mobutu's alteration of the "African heritage" to serve his own ends upon Zaïrian society; perhaps one of the reasons why the regime remained in power for so long is because of the ambiguous nature of authenticité and its versatility in coopting traditional features of Congolese societypatrilineal power relations or the "objectification" of the chieftain, as discussed earlier-in support of a repressive intent. After all, the abacost and animation did find a number of supporters, at least at the time when they were first introduced-supporters like Matulu, for example. Nevertheless, such understanding of the postcolonial subject as completely acquiescent or subservient seems to overlook possible strategies of insubordination that lay outside our common conceptions of resistance, time, and history.
Consider the endurance of practices like kindoki, toro, iloki or evu, whose translations as "witchcraft" oftentimes inaccurately "[allocate] the concepts to a domain, together with assess the political, social, and cultural role of kindoki in reaction to the foreign innovations of Belgian rule, or the domestic perversions of the Mobutist state.
Studying the authenticity that authenticité purposefully evaded would allow us to look at Congolese history itself at face value, without discarding the singularities that distinguish it from other societies-foreign as they may seem. We must do this, in part, by acknowledging the fact these terms that help us make sense of the world-words like "state,"
"nation" and "government"-do not always reflect the reality they are meant to convey, whether due to the failings of an oppressive regime 73 or the shortcomings of their conceptual underpinnings. The persistence of kindoki also indicates that it is crucial to take into consideration a different time that is not our own, this "time of history and of collective memory (culturally Judeo-Christian) [which] provides the basis for the objectivisation of the world," in Jewsiewicki's words, 74 nor the "suspended time" calling for the effacement of a traumatic experience while establishing two separate epochs that gravitate around an impenetrable wound-a time authenticité exemplifies, but as the rule rather than the exception. This time permeates the way we remember the past in African and European historiographies as in political discourses, be it in the former imperial Belgium or in the Zaïrian postcolony. It remains a necessity to look at history from the perspective of yet another time, one that resists our attempts to conquer it, to subject it to the paradoxical and biased histories we tell ourselves in a desperate effort to grasp the meaning of, and retain control over, these memories that stubbornly refuse to leave us. 73 As De Boeck writes: "Why is a building called 'national bank,' 'university,' 'state department,' 'hospital' or 'school' when the activities which take place in it cannot be given standard meanings and realities usually covered by those words? . . . Why continue the social convention of referring to a banknote as 'money' when one is confronted daily with the fact that it is just a worthless slip of paper?" In De Boeck, "Postcolonialism, Power and Identity," 91. 
